TEMIR YO‘L YO‘LOVCHI TASHISH IQTISODIY SAMARADORLIGINING NAZARIY ASOSI
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23065726Abstract
Temir yo‘l yo‘lovchi tashish korxonalari faoliyatining iqtisodiy samaradorligini an’anaviy “natija/xarajat” nisbati orqali baholashning nazariy jihatdan yetarli emasligi hamda samaradorlik kategoriyasini ko‘p darajali tizim sifatida qayta talqin qilish zarurati tadqiq etilgan. Tadqiqotning maqsadi yo‘lovchi tashish korxonasida samaradorlikni shakllantiruvchi omillar tizimini aniqlash hamda uni texnologik-operatsion, moliyaviy-iqtisodiy va ijtimoiy-tizimli darajalar muvozanati sifatida asoslashdan iborat. “O‘ztemiryo‘lyo‘lovchi” AJning 2020–2025-yillardagi statistik ma’lumotlari tahlil qilinib, mavjud ilmiy yondashuvlar ikki mezon — resurs sarfini miqdoriy o‘lchash darajasi va ijtimoiy vazifani hisobga olish darajasi — bo‘yicha xaritalashtirilgan. Natijalarga ko‘ra, yo‘lovchi aylanmasi 2,10 marta va vagon-kilometr hajmi 1,72 marta oshgan sharoitda bandlik darajasi 22,0 foizga o‘sgani hamda bu holat yo‘lovchi oqimi va quvvatning turli sur’atlarda tiklanganini ko‘rsatishi aniqlangan. Mavjud sakkizta nazariy yondashuvda taklif etilgan quvvat, realizatsiya qilingan quvvat va ijtimoiy vazifani yagona baholash tartibida birlashtirish masalasi yetarlicha yoritilmagani asoslangan.Keywords
iqtisodiy samaradorlik, temir yo‘l transporti, yo‘lovchi tashish, ko‘p darajali baholash, tariflarni tartibga solish, kompensatsiya mexanizmiReferences
1. Farrell M. J. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency // Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series
A. — 1957. — Vol. 120, No. 3. — P. 253–290.
2. Farsi M., Filippini M., Greene W. Efficiency Measurement in Network Industries: Application to the Swiss
Railway Companies // Journal of Regulatory Economics. — 2005. — Vol. 28, No. 1. — P. 69–90.
3. Cowie J. The Technical Efficiency of Public and Private Ownership in the Rail Industry: The Case of Swiss
Private Railways // Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. — 1999. — Vol. 33, No. 3. — P. 241–252.
4. Laffont J.-J., Tirole J. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. — Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1993. — 705 p.
5. Holmström B., Milgrom P. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and
Job Design // Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. — 1991. — Vol. 7. — P. 24–52.
6. Wardman M. Public Transport Values of Time // Transport Policy. — 2004. — Vol. 11, No. 4. — P. 363–377.
7. Preston J. Rail Transport Economics and Policy Analysis // Transport Reviews. — 2021.
8. Mohring H. Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation // The American Economic
Review. — 1972. — Vol. 62, No. 4. — P. 591–604.
9. Talluri K. T., van Ryzin G. J. The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management. — New York: Springer,
2004. — 717 p.
10. “O‘ztemiryo‘lyo‘lovchi” AJ statistik ma’lumotlari, 2020–2025-yillar. — Toshkent, 2026.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 GREEN ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
